Francine Mestrum, Global Social Justice

www.globalsocialjustice.eu ; mestrum@skynet.be

 

Het lege concept van ‘ontwikkeling’

Wie vandaag, anno 2011, documenten leest van de VN van de jaren ’60 en ’70, heeft moeite te geloven dat er staat wat er staat. Ondanks de kritiek die er toen al, en terecht, was op het ontwikkelingsproject had het concept wel degelijk inhoud. Het was een collectief emanciperend en moderniserend plan voor landen en samenlevingen. Na het ‘verloren decennium’ van de jaren ’80 met de invoering van ‘structurele aanpassingen’ stelde de Wereldbank in 1990 ‘armoedebestrijding’ voor. Hiermee verschoof de aandacht van landen naar mensen. De economische ontwikkeling en de ontwikkelingseconomie werden vergeten.

De vraag is wat er in het post-MDG2015 tijdperk moet gebeuren? Zowel de VN als diverse ngo’s en academici werken aan een nieuw paradigma. Centraal daarin staat, voor de VN, een universele sociale bescherming.

De lege ton van de ‘samenwerking’

De rijke landen hebben nooit hun beloften nageleefd om 0,7 % van hun nationaal inkomen aan ontwikkelingssamenwerking te besteden. De ‘hulp’ ligt ook meer en meer onder vuur. Sommigen zoeken naar meer ‘effectiviteit’, anderen betrouwen op de markt. Feit is dat de hulp geenszins haar doel heeft bereikt, noch voor het dichten van de kloof tussen arm en rijk, en zelfs niet voor de zeer bescheiden millenniumdoelstellingen.

Vandaag ligt de klemtoon meer en meer op veiligheid en op ‘fragiele staten’, met een risico van meer militaire interventies. In de praktijk komt hulp nu vooral van particuliere initiatieven waarmee wel mensen kunnen geholpen worden, maar waarmee geen enkel structureel probleem wordt opgelost.

Een andere wereld is er al

We gaan naar een wereld zonder klassieke ontwikkelingssamenwerking. De wereld is veranderd en er ontstaan nieuwe machtsverhoudingen. De ‘BRIC’s’ worden vandaag verondersteld mee de Eurozone te helpen redden!

De groei-economieën kregen in 2010 meer investeringen dan de rijke landen. Afrika wordt verder gemarginaliseerd. De investeringen uit landen van het Zuiden in landen van het Zuiden zijn in 2010 met meer dan 20 % toegenomen. Sommige landen die ontwikkelingssteun krijgen zijn ondertussen zelf donoren geworden, hoewel de Zuid-Zuid samenwerking lang niet zo positief is als ze soms wordt voorgesteld.

Toch blijft de mondiale ongelijkheid erg groot.

Besluit

Het Noorden zal zijn ontwikkelingsmodel totaal moeten herdenken, omdat het huidige model niet veralgemeenbaar is.

Er zal een daadwerkelijk solidariteitsmechanisme met het Zuiden moet ingesteld worden, o.m. gebaseerd op mondiale fiscaliteit. Solidariteit, op basis van gedeelde doelstellingen, staat haaks op hulp.

De solidariteit zal vooral gericht moeten zijn op een ‘gemeenschappelijk goed van de mensheid’ waar de mondiale publieke goederen, zoals o.m. een universele sociale bescherming, milieubescherming en gendergelijkheid deel van uitmaken.

Dit is de enige manier, zo lijkt me, om aan de mondialisering een concrete en positieve inhoud te geven en een eind te maken aan de financiering van het Noorden door het Zuiden. We moeten ons wereldbeeld dekoloniseren.

Het mondiaal Centrum Haarlem organiseert dit najaar (2011) in samenwerking met het Platform DSE een basiscursus ‘eerlijke economie’.

De cursus bestaat uit vier dagdelen (op 11 en 25 oktober, 8 en 22 november 2011)

Voor elke sessie zijn achtergrondstukken beschikbaar, die via links op deze pagina te vinden zijn.

Sessie 1 (11 oktober)

Spreker Lou Keune

Achtergrondstukken:

Geld Kun je Niet Eten, Tulpen Wel (op joop.nl)

Waar is het Debat over de Inrichting van de Economie Gebleven? (op joop.nl)

Powerpoint presentaties DOPP (pdf)

De Grote Leugen van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking

En hier de slides (pdf) die Lou Keune heeft getoond op de eerste avond.

Sessie 2 (25 oktober)

 

Sessie 3 (8 november)

 

Sessie 4 (22 november)

op 14 november 2011 zal in Utrecht een expertmeeting plaatsvinden over Internationaal Ontwikkelingsbeleid en Mondiaal Bestuur

Op aparte pagina’s is de achterliggende informatie daarvoor te vinden.

Hier de algemene achtergrond informatie

En hier een uitgebreide verzameling begeleidende stukken

Een apart serie stukken van de inleiders vindt u hier.

En na afloop komt er natuurlijk een verslag.

 

Trouw

19 september 2011 maandag

Pleidooi voor wereldwijd sociaal vangnet

BYLINE: Han Koch

SECTION: Vandaag; Blz. 4

LENGTH: 435 woorden

– Advies komt op bordje G20 terecht – Plan hoeft landen niet veel te kosten

Om de armoede in de wereld beter te bestrijden en te zorgen dat crises geen vat krijgen op de allerarmsten moeten mondiaal sociale vangnetten worden opgebouwd. Maatregelen voor de zwakkeren hebben bewezen dat ze niet alleen beschermen, maar in crisistijd ook zorgen dat de vraag naar producten wordt gevoed en zo bijdragen aan verhoging van de productiviteit.

Dat pleidooi houdt een adviesgroep die is ingesteld door de ILO, de arbeidsorganisatie van de VN. De groep onder leiding van de voormalige Chileense presidente Michelle Bachelet vindt dat sociale vangnetten mondiaal geaccepteerd moeten worden. Een rapport over deze sociale beschermingswallen, in bezit van deze krant, zal aan de G20 (de groep van twintig voor de wereldeconomie belangrijkste landen) worden aangeboden. Mogelijk dat deze week de plannen van de groep-Bachelet ook ter sprake komen tijdens de jaarvergadering van de Wereldbank en het IMF.

De laatste instelling heeft voor de adviesgroep een aantal modellen doorgerekend. Daaruit blijkt dat ontwikkelingslanden als Benin, El Salvador, Mozambique en Vietnam omvangrijke sociale vangnetten kunnen opbouwen tegen relatief lage kosten. Het zou gaan om slechts 1 tot 2 procent van het bruto nationaal inkomen van die landen. De groep denkt zelfs dat de kosten voor een belangrijk deel gedekt kunnen worden door effectievere inning van belasting bij de rijken en door het bestrijden van inefficiëntie in bestaande programma’s. Wanneer er in een land onvoldoende financiering voor handen is zal ontwikkelingshulp moeten bijdragen. Maar uitgangspunt is dat het land zelf het vangnet betaalt.

De groep-Bachelet wil dat snel met een aantal landen wordt begonnen. Die landen worden niet aangewezen, maar kunnen zichzelf aanmelden. De sociale vangnetten moeten niet de al bestaande sociale verzkeringen vervangen.

Wellicht dat in veel rijke landen het bestaan van een sociaal vangnet vanzelfsprekend is, maar uit cijfers van de ILO blijkt dat 5,1 miljard mensen op de wereld (75 procent) het zonder sociale zekerheid moeten stellen. En ondanks alle inspanningen in het kader van de VN-Millenniumcampagne leeft nog altijd 1,4 miljard mensen van minder dan 1,25 dollar per dag.

Per land dient bekeken te worden hoe het sociale vangnet eruit moet zien. De groep toont zich vooral voorstander van uitkeringen die tevens een verplichting inhouden. Een voorbeeld is de Bolsa Familia in Brazilië. Via die regeling krijgen gezinnen een bijdrage, mits ze ervoor zorgen dat hun kinderen naar school gaan.

 

Trouw

19 september 2011 maandag

Elk land zijn eigen vangnet

BYLINE: Han Koch

SECTION: Economie; Blz. 10

LENGTH: 731 woorden

– VN-commissie: Arme lidstaten moeten in toekomst zelf sociale voorzieningen treffen

Pensioenen voor ouderen, uitkeringen voor mensen die niet kunnen werken en toeslagen om kinderen naar school te kunnen sturen. Maar ook toegang tot de gezondsheidszorg en de beschikbaarheid van drinkwater. Niemand op deze wereld zou zonder deze zekerheden moeten leven.

De werkelijkheid is anders, zo ziet een adviesgroep onder aanvoering van de voormalige Chileense presidente Michelle Bachelet. De groep roept de internationale gemeenschap op overal ter wereld, in elk land, een sociaal vangnet te installeren. Het is een pleidooi voor het maken van sociale afspraken die afglijden in diepe ellende moet voorkomen.

Op 20 februari 2011 riep VN-baas Ban Ki-moon op de Werelddag voor sociale rechtvaardigheid al: “Niemand zou moeten leven beneden een bepaald inkomensniveau en iedereen moet toegang hebben tot publieke diensten als riolering en drinkwater, gezondsheidszorg en onderwijs.”

De woorden van Ban Ki-moon lijken veel op de verklaringen begin deze eeuw bij het opstellen van de zogeheten Millenniumdoelen van de Verenigde Naties. Moet daaruit worden geconcludeerd dat alle energie die is gestoken in het halen van die doelen, zoals het halveren van de armoede in de wereld in 2015 en terugdringen van moedersterfte, voor niets is geweest?

Nee, zegt de commissie-Bachelet. Nee, zegt ook Eveline Herfkens. De voormalige minister voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking maakt deel uit van de commissie en schreef een rapport over de relatie tussen het bestaande Millenniumprogramma en het nieuwe idee voor sociale vangnetten.

Die sociale vangnetten moeten volgens Herfkens zowel een aanvulling als een correctie zijn op de Millenniumdoelen. Die doelen gaan uit van gemiddelden. Het gemiddelde inkomen kan in een land best gestegen zijn, maar dat zegt niets over de welvaartsverdeling in dat land. Wanneer je alleen kijkt naar gemiddelden tonen de Millenniumdoelen volgens Herfkens een geweldige progressie, ook al worden wellicht over vier jaar niet alle doelen gehaald.

De succesverhalen op basis van de gemiddelden kunnen echter maskeren dat grote groepen kwetsbare en niet makkelijk te bereiken mensen geen profijt hebben van de inspanningen. Het gebrek aan aandacht voor bijvoorbeeld de verdeling van welvaart tussen arme en rijk dat in de Millenniumdoelen niet wordt opgelost, kan volgens Herfkens door instelling van sociale vangnetten worden opgevangen.

Het idee veronderstelt dat economische groei meer armoede bestrijdt door een afname van de inkomensongelijkheid. Herfkens ziet in menig onderzoek van de Wereldbank bewijs voor die gedachte.

De voormalige rechterhand bij de Milllenniumcampagne van toenmalig VN-baas Kofi Annan ziet in de introductie van sociale vangnetten per land een goede methode om af te komen van het debat over de gemiddelden van de Millenniumdoelen. Het debat dient volgens haar te verschuiven naar de instelling van nationale sociale zekerheden, al was het maar om een antwoord te krijgen op de vraag wat die andere helft van de armen mag verwachten als in 2015 de Millenniumdoelen, inclusief die van halvering van de armoede, gehaald zijn.

Het pleidooi voor sociale vangnetten heeft de wind mee. De nieuwe generatie leiders van G20-landen als Brazilië, China, India, Indonesië, Mexico en Zuid-Afrika hebben volgens Herfkens vaak zelf al aan de wieg gestaan van initiatieven voor het optuigen van sociale zekerheden. Zij wijst er ook op dat al in 45 ontwikkelingslanden programma’s met sociale uitkeringen worden uitgevoerd.

De reikwijdte, zo’n 110 miljoen gezinnen, is nog gering. Maar mede dankzij nieuw elan bij de Afrikaanse Unie is op het terrein van de sociale zekerheid in Afrika bezuiden de Sahara al het een en ander veranderd. Zeker vijftien landen hebben in hun grondwet passages opgenomen over een sociale agenda.

Het pleidooi van de commissie-Bachelet om nationale sociale vangnetten in het leven te roepen, markeert een herijking van het denken over hulp. De Millenniumdoelen worden niet ter zijde geschoven, maar krijgen een nieuwe impuls.

De aandacht voor de Millenniumagenda had vooral als doel het rijke Westen bij de les te houden. Met het pleidooi voor sociale vangetten verschuift de aandacht van het Westen naar de regeringen in ontwikkelingslanden. Zij moeten nu hun burgers sociale voorzieningen gaan leveren.

Wat mogen armen verwachten na de Millenniumdoelen?

 

Lou Keune

Development Cooperation:

A Hindrance for Self-Sustainable Development¹

Abstract

Since the eighties, worldwide policies regarding development cooperation have been dominated by neo-liberal thought. This policy has included privatization, deregulation, decreasing the role of the government, a restrictive budget policy, abolishing subsidies, free movement of capital and profits, and open markets. Nevertheless, large-scale poverty has remained, and income disparity has increased. Looking back, one can question the idea that development cooperation in reality includes net flows from the North to the South. The developing countries have received less in loans than they have paid in debt payments and interest. Equally, they have seen more profits drain away than direct investments coming in. Since 1980, the deterioration of the terms of trade of developing countries has led to a total loss three times greater than the total amount of all official development aid. Both the worldwide domination by free market principles as well as the reverse development aid are limiting the possibilities for self-development of the poorer parts of the population. The pressure on developing countries and their residents to completely throw open their economies must stop. The right to their own development must be acknowledged, and thereby also the right to choose the most adequate development strategy.

Introduction: A broadened concept of development cooperation

The meaning of the term ‘development cooperation’ broadened during the second half of the last century. Originally it referred to development aid (so-called) and the cooperation between national and international actors involved in the designing and implementing of development programmes. Especially during the sixties and seventies, a lot of attention was paid to various bottom-up strategies such as self-help programs, fundamental education, community development, the cooperative movement, intermediate technology, and land reform. From the first UNCTAD conference (1964), more and more attention was paid to the subject of world trade, in particular to the contribution it could make to the development of countries in the South. ‘Trade, not aid’ became the motto. Reform of the world trade relations was thereby considered to belong to the field of development cooperation. The space for bottom-up approaches remained intact. Possibilities were even seen for better participation by the poorer sections of world population in international trade through local initiatives. Little by little, the possible contribution of foreign private capital became considered significant in both development literature as well as development policies. That significance would mostly lie in the possibilities for international business to modernize the economies of the South, to offer credit, create employment, and increase the proceeds of foreign currency. Thus the term ‘development cooperation’ came to cover world trade and investments and loans by international business, as well as traditional developmental aid.

Neo-liberalization of development cooperation

Since the eighties, worldwide policies regarding development cooperation have been dominated by neo-liberal thought. Supposedly, development would only be possible if not only local, regional and national economies, but also the world economy, were arranged in such a way that production and distribution, including that of the development and implementation of technologies, were led by free market principles. The implementation of this school of thought has led to certain concrete forms of economic policy. International institutions such as the World Bank and its associated regional Development Banks and the IMF have exerted a certain amount of pressure on the national governments of developing countries. That pressure became possible because many developing countries were hit by the so-called debt crisis, as they were unable to meet their credit obligations to public and private lenders. If they wanted to come to what were known as debt settlements, they were dependent on the aforementioned supranational financial institutions. This form of international dependency meant that these institutions could make conditions that delved deeply into national policy and therefore also into the further constitution and development of national economies. Other multinational donors, like the European Union, and bilateral donors, like the individual governments of the high-income countries, followed that policy. The space for the developing countries in question to make their own policies was thus severely restricted. This restriction also involved curtailing the possibilities of following individualized courses of development based on local or regional contexts. The space for local initiatives also became much smaller. All of this also led to the famous Structural Adjustment Programmes – SAP’s. These included privatization, deregulation, decreasing the role of the government, a restrictive budget policy, abolishing many subsidies, free movement of capital including profits, and ending restrictions on imports and exports.

Consequences

Despite these changes in policy, very persistent, fundamental questions remain. Large-scale poverty has persisted and income disparity actually increased, both within countries as well as world-wide (UNDP, 2005, chapters 1 and 2). The ratio of the income of the poorest 10% of the world population to the richest 10% is 1 to 103 (UNDP, 2005, p.38). Because of this, in the early stage of neo-liberalization there were already pleas from within UNICEF for ‘adjustment with a human face’ (Cornia at. al., 1987). Furthermore, regarding nature and the environment, the living planet index is moving downwards and now stands at –40 (WWF, 2004, p.1). We will return to the connection between these negative developments and neo-liberal policy.

This policy has also led to other consequences, which several people warned about at an early stage (e.g. Susan George, 1994). After all, the policy didn’t just lead to continuing large-scale poverty, increasing inequality and further degradation of nature and the environment. It also led to far-reaching structural changes in various national economies as well as in the world economy. First among these structural changes was the opening up of those economies in many ways. The countries involved were and are still obligated to guarantee a free flow of capital. In other words, they were opened up to foreign investment and at the same time forced to remove restrictions for the transfer of profit to other countries, usually the home countries of the investors concerned. The reasoning behind this policy was that economic growth would be strongly stimulated by this foreign investment, which would modernize the local economy (‘modern enterprise’), and also create employment. The privatization policy supported this. All kinds of activities, which until then had been done by the governmental authorities or non-governmental agencies, became the domain of private investors who were often able to acquire public utilities at relatively low prices. This included public utilities regarding energy, water, transport, health care, agricultural education, telephone operating systems, etc. This meant de facto that a large part of the foreign investments were not really investments in the sense that they created new units of production, distribution and transport, but rather takeovers of existing capital. The public goods, which were privatized in this way, were thus more or less removed from policies based on established needs. Instead they became principally based on the laws of the economic competition, in which maximizing profits is first and foremost.

Export led economic growth

Another policy with far-reaching structural consequences was the principle of export led economic growth. Exporting was seen not only as a way to increase the capacity to repay debt, but also as a way to create new economic possibilities. Participation in world trade became the ultimate aim. And that world trade should have to be as free as possible. After all, according to the neo-liberals, hadn’t David Ricardo already shown early in the development of the science of economics that the specializations of countries based on comparative costs sprouting from free trade would be to everyone’s advantage? Now this mandatory free trade was basically forced upon developing countries that were severely weakened by debt and other circumstances. Large developing countries like India and China could (to a certain extent) back out of that obligation. That certainly applied to the rich industrial countries. This is the mechanism pointed out by Chang (2004), namely that countries which themselves have become strong based in part on protecting their own markets, afterwards force free trade upon other countries. With that same history, the world market became the stage of a competition between unequal parties. Apart from the fact that under that same banner of free trade, many examples arose of exporting agricultural products for dump prices, sometimes masquerading as food aid. This constituted serious competition for the existing agriculture and cattle farming in developing countries.

During this rapid expansion of neo-liberal thought, with all the positive developments according to its advocates, the fact that a number of developing countries were experiencing rapid economic growth based on the protection of their economies and the support of directly intervening governments, including a strong expansion of their international exports, was kept outside the discussion as much as possible. In countries like South Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Brazil, for example, economic growth was strongly stimulated by import-substituting investments and fast-growing exports in modern sectors like electronics, cars and clothing. These countries were soon being called the Newly Industrialized Countries – NIC’s. These countries were often cited in the debate about development strategy, with the suggestion that free trade had been much to their advantage, despite the fact that they were ruled by strong and in some cases dictatorial governments. They were, and continue to be, countries that look out for one-sided outward orientation possibilities while ascribing much importance to an inward-oriented policy.

‘Free trade, not aid’

All of this happened during a time when the growth of contributions by the high-income countries to public development aid stagnated. This was a reflection of the growing reluctance in most OECD countries regarding public responsibility for developing countries. At the same time, the task of stimulating development was seen more and more as belonging to private business, which could profit from the favorable conditions created by the SAP’s. Thus we saw a growth of private investments, both in absolute terms and also in comparison to the official development aid. Increasingly, the motto became ‘leave it to the entrepreneurs, they know what to do’. The role of world trade was also coming to be considered more and more important. ‘Free trade, not aid’ became the motto, strongly legitimizing the growing free trade.

Reverse development aid

Much can be said against these and other neo-liberal arguments. Let us look at a number of factual developments. To what extent has there really been a transfer of financial means to developing countries?

First, the theme of the losses the developing countries suffer when dealing with the richer countries must be addressed. Back in the early nineties, the UNDP presented calculations that basically showed these losses to be sizable (UNDP, 1992, p.67). In 1990, the losses amounted to US $ 500 billion, whereas the official development aid amounted to US $ 50 billion (see Figure 1). These are losses due to what could be described as ‘lost opportunities’ caused by discriminating relations in world markets. For example, developing countries usually have to pay more interest on borrowed capital. Another example is the restriction on the international mobility of labor.

Figure 1: Costs of global markets to developing countries (US $ billions)

Within this broad category of ‘lost opportunities’ exists the phenomenon of reverse development aid. Recently I have researched the actual developments since 1980 of two parts of the financial flows. Looking at the category of loans to developing countries, both public and private, I calculated (based on UNCTAD, 2004, Table 6.6) that measured over the total time period, developing countries have received less in loans than they have paid in debt payments and interest (see Table 1). Relatively speaking, the differences are not large, but they support the conclusion that the developing countries are not net receivers of loans. In fact, they themselves have financed the loans they received. This conclusion essentially holds even for those countries, which are neither major oil exporters nor large industrial exporters, a group which shows a small positive balance.

Table 1: Loans received and debt payments 1980 – 2001 (US $ millions)

	All developing countries	Major oil- exporting developing countries	Other developing countries
			All other countries	Major industrial exporters	Other counties
Loans	2.980.600	440.277	2.540.323	1.673.374	866.950
Debt payments	3.192.508	573.729	2.618.778	1.810.885	807.894
Difference	-211.907	-133.452	-78.455	-137.511	59.056

Figure 2 shows that loans received and debt payments have maintained equilibrium during a large part of this time period. After the millennium change, however, a negative balance becomes notable.

Figure 2: Loans received and debt payments – all developing countries (US $ millions)

It should be noted, therefore, that this way of financing foreign loans has been unable to prevent the (long term) debt of all developing countries from growing during this period – from US $ 325 billion in 1980 to US $ 1,028 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD 2004, Table 6.6).

The second category of financial flow concerns foreign direct investments in developing countries in relation to profits draining from those same countries. I have also made calculations about this based on payment balances data (UNCTAD, 2004, Tables 6.1A and 6.1B) – see Table 2.

Table 2: Foreign direct investments and profit drains 1980 – 2003 (US $ millions)

	All developing countries	Major oil- exporting developing countries	Other developing countries
			All other countries	Major industrial exporters	Other counties
Foreign direct investments	1.450.981	107.951	1.343.029	993.602	349.427
Profit drains	-1.632.156	-37.916	-1.594.240	-994.178	-600.062
Difference	-181.175	70.036	-251.211	-26.403	-250.635

The table shows that developing countries, except the major oil exporters, saw more profit drain away than direct investments come in. During this time (see Figure 3), the size of these investments increased considerably in the nineties, which caused a positive result for a number of years. As of the new millennium, however, it seems to have been moving in the opposite direction again.

Figure 3: Received foreign direct investments and profit drains – all developing countries (US $ millions)

Ecological footprints

When looking at loans and private investments it is clear that a net transfer of financial means from out of the developing countries has occurred. But transfers can happen in different ways. For example, data from the World Wildlife Fund about the burdens on the natural capacity of the earth can be seen as indications of a different kind of reverse development aid. These data (WWF, 2004, p.10) show that, looking at the average ecological footprint per person per year, the world is at present using over 20% more on a yearly basis than should be allowed according to estimates based on sustainability. And that footprint is becoming more pronounced every year (WWF, 2004, p.1) – see Figure 4.

Figure 4: Humanity’s ecological footprint 1961-2001 (number of planets)

It is mainly the rich countries that are responsible for the worldwide over-burdening. The average footprint in 2001 in the high-income countries was 6.4 ha/person, that of the middle-income countries 1.9 ha/person (about the level that would be acceptable based on sustainability), and that of the low-income countries 0.8 ha/person (WWF, 2004, p.24). An enormous economic debt is building, from the North to the entire world and certainly to the developing countries. It might be interesting to attempt a financial evaluation of this form of reverse development aid.

Deterioration of the terms of trade

There is another transfer that is not easy to assess financially either, but which in terms of size is even more important than that referred to in the category of loans and private investments. This has to do with the development of the terms of trade. The terms of trade are used to indicate the relationship of the average prices of exported goods to those of imported goods. For developing countries in general, this has been deteriorating since 1980. As a result, developing countries must supply more and more energy in their exports, in the form of human and natural values, in order to be able to ‘pay’ the proportionately higher costs of their imports. The old example of a coffee exporting nation having to export an ever-greater number of bags of coffee to be able to import one jeep has lost none of its relevance. I have attempted to express these losses in monetary terms. Again using UNCTAD data (UNCTAD, 2004, Table 6.5), I have calculated what the monetary value of exports and imports would have been if the average prices had remained constant, and then compared these new values with the actual monetary value of exports and imports in order to then be able to ascertain the relative gains and losses (see table 3).

Table 3: Terms of trade gains and losses 1980 – 2002 (US $ millions)

	All developing countries	Major oil- exporting developing countries	Other developing countries
			All other countries	Major industrial exporters	Other counties
Exports	-4.568.976	-1.873.463	-4.099.870	-2.838.512	-886.368
Imports	912.028	-842.656	1.660.633	1.995.431	48.367
Difference	-3.656.948	-2.716.119	-2.439.237	-843.081	-838.001

These losses are enormous, and in all categories considered (major oil exporters, industrial exporters and others). By comparison, during the same period from 1980 – 2002 the developing countries received a total of US $ 1.321 billion in official financial flows, including the loans financed by those countries themselves. The terms of trade loss during the entire period from 1980 – 2002 is that in triplicate. Obviously the size of these losses is not related just to prices, but also to the size of participation in international trade. Terms of trade losses are hardly seen as problematic these days. This might be because they are in contradiction of the assumed effectiveness of participation in world trade. Additionally, if we examine the terms of trade deterioration on an annual basis, we see a steady increase in that loss (see Figure 5). This can be partly explained through the increased amount of international trade by the developing countries.

Figure 5: Terms of trade gains and losses – all developing countries (US $ millions)

Liberalization and economic growth

It could be argued that these forms of reverse development aid are lamentable, but do not say anything about the actual contribution that financial transfers and liberalization of trade have made to the economic development of the developing countries. For example, one might argue that foreign private investments and international trade, their characterization in terms of profit drains and unequal trade notwithstanding, have actually increased productivity. There is, in fact, recent research covering precisely this topic, from which an image emerges different to that which the conventional wisdom would lead us to expect. Halit Yanikkaya, for example, has tried to find an answer to the question, ‘Do open economies grow faster than closed economies?’ Yanikkaya published an article on this in 2003 with the results of his research into the relationship between economic growth and trade restrictions or trade liberalization. He concluded thus:

‘Surprisingly, unlike the literature on the growth effects of trade intensity ratios, findings of empirical studies of trade restrictions are considerably different from predictions of theoretical studies. Even though the theoretical growth studies provided no conclusive evidence about the direction of growth effects of trade barriers, especially for developing countries, a great majority of the empirical studies concluded that there exists a significant and negative relationship between trade restrictions and growth. Whereas, our results are much closer to the predictions of theoretical studies and evidently contradict the findings of earlier empirical studies. We believe that our results cast substantial doubts on the conventional view that suggests a robust and negative relationship between trade barriers and growth. In other words, all measures of trade barriers used in the study are significantly and positively correlated with growth. Thus, our results actually provide considerable evidence for the hypothesis that restrictions on trade can promote growth, especially of developing countries under certain conditions.’ (Yanikkaya, p.85)

Egor Kraev (2005) very recently published his research entitled ‘Estimating GDP effects of trade liberalisation for developing countries’. Kraev researched the effects of that liberalization for the period 1975 – 2001 on both the balance of payments and the gross domestic product (GDP) of the countries involved. Kraev used data from the World Bank and the IMF, limiting himself to the low-income countries on which sufficient data are available, and calculating according to the starting year in which trade liberalization was implemented in each country. In total, this research covers 32 countries, most of which are situated in Africa, although large countries like Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Pakistan are also included. Kraev specifically addresses the consequences of the disappearance of demand that might occur as a result of liberalization:

‘Trade liberalization in poor countries led to an increase in exports, and to an even higher increase in propensity to import. This led to a worsening of the trade balance, and at the same time a decrease in net demand for domestically produced goods and services, which likely caused a decrease of domestic income (GDP).’ (Kraev, p.2)

Kraev shows that these losses of demand have serious consequences. Quantifying this, he comes to the conclusion that for all 32 countries combined, the total loss of GDP during that period, measured in US dollars at year 2000 rates, was almost 900 billion. As Table 4 (from Kraev, 2005, p.14) shows, the losses for these 32 countries measured in terms of GDP percentages were also enormous.

Table 4: GDP impact as percentage of the respective country’s GDP (selected countries)

	1975 – 1979	1980 –1984	1985 –1989	1990 –1994	1995 –1999	2000 –2001	Average
East Asia and Pacific			4.40%	10.90%	11.00%	20.90%	11.80%
Latin America and Caribbean			14.00%	18.80%	25.50%	29.40%	21.80%
Middle East and North Africa				22.50%	21.20%	16.10%	20.70%
South Asia			4.60%	6.70%	10.60%	15.60%	10.20%
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.60%	12.70%	11.30%	8.40%	10.80%	16.70%	11.20%

We can conclude the following: the assumption that the liberalization of trade is a stimulant for economic growth in developing countries is extremely debatable. In fact, there are many indications that justify the contrary conclusion that this liberalization hampers further development. This is a conclusion also drawn by the British aid organization, Christian Aid. Based on Kraev’s research they conclude the following about sub-Saharan Africa:

‘Trade liberalization has cost sub-Saharan Africa US $ 272 billion over the past 20 years. Had they not been forced to liberalize as the price of aid, loans and debt relief, sub-Saharan African countries would have had enough extra income to wipe out their debts and have sufficient left over to pay for every child to be vaccinated and go to school. Two decades of liberalization has cost sub-Saharan Africa roughly what it has received in aid. Effectively, this aid did no more than compensate African countries for the losses they sustained by meeting the conditions that were attached to the aid they received.’ (Christian Aid, 2005, p.2)

Development cooperation and self-sustainable development

The worldwide domination by the neo-liberal development model also has worldwide consequences. It has manifested not only in phenomena like poverty, inequality and deterioration of the environment, but has also had far-reaching structural repercussions. Human and natural resources are withdrawn on a large scale from the means of existence for people in developing countries. This is only very partially compensated for by financial flows from the North to the South, financial flows that strengthen the aforementioned process of withdrawal. Through this alone, the developing countries are already severely limited in their possibilities for the future.

The productive potential (human and natural resources) in developing countries is thereby progressively aimed at production primarily for export, not at increasing the standard of living in those countries. In an institutional sense, the economy is increasingly dominated by private business, with the maximization of profit as its main aim. Through the tendency of capital to concentrate, the door is opened to an increase in power of the large international private actors. Therefore, the power of local public authorities to implement policies primarily aimed at an all-inclusive general welfare is limited. This does not exclude an increase in prosperity. Nevertheless, a lot of research shows that an increase of the average level of prosperity, insofar as this can be ascertained, is coupled with increased inequality and the marginalization of a large part of the population.

It must be concluded that the possibilities for self-development of the poorer parts of the population are limited. Their participation in the growing activity in the sectors led by corporate business will be limited in the long term, because they are also subject to intensifying international competition. We have already seen this occur in many sectors of economic activity in developing countries. There is a continual movement of economic activity from one country to another. For example, the clothing industry in Bangladesh and India suffers from competition with China. Important parts of the assembly companies stationed in free trade zones in Mexico and Central America are being transferred to other countries without being replaced with new economic activity. The large increase in world production of coffee has led (until recently) to strongly decreased coffee prices causing serious problems for many coffee farmers and their families in, for example, Central America. In other words, the sectors aimed at world trade offer limited prospects for the large masses of urban and rural poor. Added to that is the fact that activities which could expand because they are producing for worldwide growing markets (like soy and tourism) can hamper the opportunities for other activities. There are ever more reports about how the fast expansion of the cultivation of (modified!) soy in countries like Brazil and Argentina is pushing out small farmers, with severe social and ecological consequences. There are also examples of tourism at the cost of local farming and fishing, as well as the local nature and environment (Keune and Vugts, 2002).

This is also true for the sectors aimed at domestic sales. Their production and trade has also become dominated by large companies, which are motivated by profits, and have important competitive advantages such as economies of scale and access to the most modern technologies. Of course this also means that in these markets there are less prospects for small farmers, craftspeople, transporters and traders.

In short, the opportunities for small producers and low-income groups to attain bottom-up development, including development of the most adequate technologies, are decreasing. For them, the most attainable prospects might well be survival strategies. Such strategies could consist of concentrating even more on the production of goods and services for themselves and, through barter, for others in similarly marginalized situations. These are, by definition, prospects not primarily concerned with development but with just surviving as well as possible. And in this context, the development and implementation of special technologies can be of great importance. For example, the technical possibilities to produce building materials with very limited resources and using them for shelter. In other words, survival can also be improved. Even for these survival strategies, however, the prospects are not bright. Take the example of the large-scale cultivation of soy: through various mechanisms (such as buying the land) small, self-sufficient farmers are encouraged to leave their land and live elsewhere.

New parameters for development cooperation

The above considerations might lead to the conclusion that nothing can be done other than giving up. Nothing could be further from the truth. In principle there are realistic opportunities for all kinds of development, including the use of technologies that are adequate for the specific situations people are in. However, these possibilities can only manifest when certain conditions are met. The most important, and certainly the most urgent, is that the pressure on developing countries and their residents to completely throw open their economies must stop. The right to their own development must be acknowledged, and thereby also the right to choose the most adequate development strategy. This demands a profound change in the policy of supra-national institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the EU, as well as the economically powerful countries. Developing countries and regions should have the right to implement measures that offer a certain amount of protection for local and regional development without the threat of international competition.

A second condition is that the various forms of reverse development aid must come to an end. Self-sustained development is impossible when developing countries continue to lose important resources. Stopping this will, of course, have far-reaching consequences for the societies in the North. Debts must now de facto be called off. Products from developing countries must finally receive a fair price. The over-burdening of nature and the environment must end, even if that means that material production and consumption in the rich countries has to be limited. And there will have to be a system of reparation payments with its most important aims being to guarantee the survival of the large masses of the poor and marginalized and to repair the eco-systems of developing countries.

References

Chang, Ha-Joon (2004), ‘What is wrong with the ‘Official History of Capitalism’? With special reference to the debates on globalisation and economic development’, in Fullbrook, Edward (ed.), A Guide to What’s Wrong with Economics, London: Anthem Press

Christian Aid (2005), The Economics of Failure: The Real Cost of ‘Free’ Trade, London: Christian Aid

­Cornia, G. and Jolly, R. and Stewart, F. (1987), Adjustment with a Human Face, Oxford: Clarendon Press

George, Susan (1994), Faith and Credit: the World Bank’s Secular Empire, London: Penguin

Keune, Lou, and Vugts, Jan (2002), ‘The economic significance of tourism in Latin America’, in Dahles, Heidi and Keune, Lou (eds.), Tourism Development and Local Participation in Latin America, New York: Cognizant

Kraev, Egor (2005), Estimating GDP Effects of Trade Liberalisation for Developing Countries, London: Christian Aid

UNCTAD (2004), Handbook of Statistics 2004, Geneva: UNCTAD

UNDP (1992), Human Development Report 1992, New York: UNDP

UNDP (2005), Human Development Report 2005, New York: UNDP

WWF (2004), Living Planet Report 2004, Geneva: World Wildlife Fund

Yanikkaya, Halit (2003), Trade openness and economic growth, in Journal of Development Economics, Volume 72, October 2003, pages 57-89

Een knap staaltje inconsequent argumenteren dat Marc De Vos (Itinera) in ‘De Morgen’ van 13 april ten tonele brengt. Hij gaat in tegen de stelling van Richard Wilkinson (‘De Morgen’, 12 april) dat meer gelijkheid in een samenleving leidt tot het veel minder voorkomen van samenlevingskwalen als tienerzwangerschappen, geweld, zwaarlijvigheid, kindersterfte, verslaving, etc.

Economische groei: bijvoorbeeld in de strijd tegen klimaatverandering

Geconfronteerd met overweldigend bewijsmateriaal is de kritiek van De Vos gestoeld op het argument dat we correlaties niet mogen verwarren met causaliteit: we kunnen niet weten of het ongelijkheid is die tot al deze problemen leidt of, omgekeerd, deze kwalen ongelijkheid veroorzaken.

Volgens de strikte regels van de statistiek heeft De Vos gelijk, al is de kans veel kleiner dat al deze kwalen telkens de oorzaak van ongelijkheid zijn dan dat ongelijkheid de doorslaggevende determinant is, de onafhankelijke variabele, voor al deze problemen.

Maar oké, het is Marc De Vos zijn goed recht om door te bomen over het verschil tussen correlatie en causaliteit omdat dit in zijn ideologische kraam past.

Negatief verband tussen gelijkheid en economisch groei?

Het is dan vervolgens wel heel cynisch om te lezen hoe Marc De Vos in de rest van zijn stuk omspringt met wetenschappelijke standaarden. Zonder enig bewijs of model beweert hij dat er een negatief verband is tussen gelijkheid en economisch groei: een beetje meer van het ene impliceert een beetje minder van het andere en minder economische groei kunnen we ons helaas niet permitteren.

Maar is die relatie wel zo? A la guerre (des idées) comme à la guerre, dus even anekdotisch: presteren de egalitaire Scandinavische landen dan zo slecht? Het is trouwens opnieuw bijna grappig (moest het niet zo pijnlijk zijn) om te zien hoe Marc De Vos met het Scandinavische model omspringt.

Hun egalitaire samenlevingen zijn cultureel bepaald en vallen niet zomaar te transponeren naar andere landen, stelt hij. Elders zijn de auteur en zijn medestanders er wel altijd als de kippen bij om die aspecten van het Scandinavische model die hen bevallen, als flexicurity, aan te prijzen als voorbeelden die we niet snel genoeg kunnen kopiëren.

Maar terug naar de stelling dat meer gelijkheid tot minder economische groei zou leiden. Als De Vos het boek The Spirit Level van Richard Wilkinson en Kate Pickett echt gelezen heeft, dan weet hij dat de auteurs, in navolging van steeds meer economen, ook tonen dat ongelijkheid niet zozeer samengaat met meer groei, als wel met schulden en economische crises.

Schuldenlast en herverdeling

In tegenstelling tot hoe het meestal wordt voorgesteld, zijn het niet de herverdelende landen die zich onhoudbaar in de schulden steken. Integendeel, de meest ongelijke landen hebben ook de meeste private en publieke schulden.

Ongelijkheid was op die manier één van de belangrijkste oorzaken van de financieel-economische crisis. Burgers in de VS met een laag inkomen werden er gestimuleerd om schulden aan te gaan om de aankoop van een huis en consumptiegoederen te financieren en zo de economie kunstmatig draaiende te houden.

De superrijke Amerikanen belegden hun geld dan weer in financiële toxische producten die afgeleid waren van zulke leningen omdat ze hun geld toch niet opgeconsumeerd krijgen en investeren in productieve sectoren veel minder opbrengt. Dit leidde onvermijdelijk tot een zeepbel en nu zitten we allen op de blaren.

Volgens De Vos moeten we trouwens nog meer lijden: inleveren om te groeien en onze welvaartstaat betaalbaar te houden. Gelijkheid is niet gratis en leidt tot minder groei, is de stelling van De Vos.

Wel, ik daag De Vos uit te bewijzen dat dit en niet net het omgekeerde geldt: herverdeling is een stimuleringsmaatregel die niets kost.

Om een recent voorbeeld te geven. In welke mate zal de bonus van 800.000 euro die Dexia CEO Mariani onlangs kreeg toegekend bovenop zijn ‘gewoon’ loon van al meer dan één miljoen voor groei van de Belgische economie zorgen?

“Wel, ik daag De Vos uit te bewijzen dat dit en niet net het omgekeerde geldt: herverdeling is een stimuleringsmaatregel die niets kost”

Denkt u dat de bakker op de hoek van Mariani’s straat plots exponentieel zijn omzet zal zien stijgen? De kans is veel groter dat dit geld wordt belegd in wie weet welke aandelen, op die manier de volgende zeepbel voedend, dan dat het onze economie stimuleert.

Extra groei door herverdeling

Als daarentegen die 800.000 euro zouden worden verdeeld onder mensen die met een zeer laag inkomen moeten rondkomen, is de kans groot dat de plaatselijke particulieren daar wel mee van profiteren. En dat zij dat extra inkomen op hun beurt weer spenderen.

Op die manier zorgt herverdeling dus voor gratis extra economische groei. Het wordt hier ongenuanceerd voorgesteld, maar een karikatuur moet soms met een karikatuur worden beantwoord.

Het boek van Wilkinson en Pickett is echter niet karikaturaal, maar net heel genuanceerd en rigoureus onderzocht en geschreven. Het toont dat de idee van gelijkheid dat in deze tijden steeds als naïef wordt voorgesteld net wel de oplossing voor vele problemen en uitdagingen kan bieden, niet alleen voor ons welzijn (dat sommigen misschien een te ‘soft’ argument vinden), maar ook voor economische groei, en bijvoorbeeld nog de strijd tegen klimaatverandering.

Ferdi De Ville

Ferdi De Ville is verbonden aan het Steunpunt Buitenlands Beleid en de Universiteit Gent en actief binnen Poliargus.

 

Internationaal Ontwikkelingsbeleid en Mondiaal Bestuur:

naar een nieuw perspectief

Expert Meeting, 14 nov 2011, Kargadoor Utrecht

Achtergronden

 In de achter ons liggende jaren is links en rechts (geografisch, zowel als politiek) gediscussieerd over, en vanuit een breed spectrum aan insteken gelobbied en actie gevoerd inzake ontwikkelingsbeleid en de praxis van ontwikkeling. Dit vond plaats op basis van kritische beschouwingen over de effectiviteit van OS, de mate waarin erkende doelstellingen van ontwikkeling bleken te worden gehaald, de relatie handel-ontwikkeling en fair trade, de ‘omgekeerde ontwikkeling’, de doordenking van (oude en) nieuwe geo-economische en geopolitieke realiteiten (nieuwe machten, nieuwe actoren in donoren-kringen), nieuwe oriëntaties die voortvloeien uit zich aandienende crises in de sfeer van milieu (o.a. klimaat en water), voedselvoorziening, etc (de problematiek van de ‘global public goods’). Betrokken actoren waren: ontwikkelingsgerichte organisaties, academische centra etc, inclusief organisaties van andersglobalisten etc., al dan niet in het kader van het World Social Forum. In het Nederlandse taalgebied bestaat een lange traditie van voeding van deze discussie en engagement bij daarop voortbouwende actie.¹ deze is het denken over ontwikkelingssamenwerking (zij het vooral over de repercussies ervan op nationaal/bilateraal niveau) recentelijk gevoed door het WRR-rapport (Minder pretentie, meer ambitie, 2010). Internationaal ontspint zich een discussie over de oriëntatie van het ontwikkelingsbeleid “post 2015” – zowel in termen van doelstellingen als achterliggende visies (met name in VN-verband).²

 Tegelijkertijd is er sprake van groeiende erkenning van de visie dat het neoliberale model van de economische orde en van de kaders waarbinnen mondialisering zich zou dienen te voltrekken, faalt. Op internationaal niveau is het denken over structurele kanten van het ontwikkelingsbeleid weer aangewakkerd, o.a. door een rapport van de Secretaris Generaal aan de Algemene Vergadering over de “… challenges for equitable and inclusive sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and of the role of the UN in addressing these issues in the light of the New International Economic Order (A/65/272, 2010) en Resolutie A/RES/65-94 waarin de SG ook wordt gevraagd te rapporteren over “global economic governance and development” in het kader van een bezinning over de centrale rol van de VN in “global governance”. Bij dat laatste issue gaat het niet alleen om de verhoudingen tussen het VN-systeem en bijvoorbeeld de G-20, maar zou ook op de compositie en kwaliteit van de VN-structuur moeten worden gelet in het ter hand nemen van mondiale (economische) ‘governance’.

 De financieel-economische crisis leek ook binnen de traditionele ‘mainstream’ zichtbaar te maken dat het “marktfundamentalisme” (Stiglitz, 2006) achterhaald was. Het leek er bijvoorbeeld op dat ook in die kringen een structureel ander ontwikkelingspad, een “green new deal”, werd gezien als een weg om meerdere crises in een strategische bundeling tegemoet te treden, maar de aandacht daarvoor in en rond de G20 luwde snel. Ook in het denken over een “new green deal” of de “groene economie” (bijvoorbeeld in en na Rio+20) zou het niet alleen moeten gaan over kritiek op de uitkomsten van economische activiteiten en productie/consumptiepatronen op mens en milieu, maar ook over de discrepanties tussen een marktorde waarin koopkrachtige vraag en commercieel aanbod op ongereguleerde markten de economische ontwikkeling domineren, en een wereldorde gericht op rechten en de realisatie daarvan. Anders gezegd: er zit een duidelijk paradigmatische component in de discussies over ontwikkelingsprocessen, ontwikkelingsbeleid, en de mondiale economische orde.

 Uit het bovenstaande volgt de wenselijkheid van een samenhangende bezinning op:

1. de wenselijke inhoudelijke richting van een nieuw mondiaal ontwikkelingsperspectief;

2. de voor de realisatie daarvan wenselijke structuren van “global (economic) governance”; een en ander op basis van:

3. een insteek op basis van een marktkritisch vertrekpunt (cf. Myrdal: “there is no view without a viewpoint’).

Ad iii: Relevante paradigmatische aspecten zijn bijvoorbeeld: rights-based approach (incl voor sociale – en milieuaspecten), global public goods, global governance in plaats van marktprimaat, duurzaamheid i.p.v. BNP-groei (lange termijn, groen), ‘needs driven’ (in plaats van koopkracht/marktgestuurd), versterkte zelfredzaamheid + solidariteit, inclusiviteit/participatie. In het teken van een meer fundamentele discussie over ontwikkeling staat bijvoorbeeld het recente boek van Francine Mestrum: Ontwikkeling en Solidariteit, 2010). Aangesloten kan worden bij de gedachte dat het gezien de nieuwe crises op langere termijn gaat om een kwestie van overleven meer dan om traditionele ontwikkeling.

Ad i: Prioriteiten en strategie: hier is een schril contrast tussen de ontwikkeling van de agenda’s van verschillende landen, bijvoorbeeld over de mate waarin ontwikkelingsbeleid geënt kan worden op donor-belangen, de mate waarin moet worden ingezet op economische zelfredzaamheid dan wel er ook ruimte moet zijn voor sociale aspecten, etcetera. Uit de genoemde VN-rapporten blijkt een streven tot heroriëntatie op een inhoudelijke agenda voor “equitable, inclusive and sustainable development”, met als hoofdelementen: werk/werkgelegenheid (structurele economische ontwikkeling), “groene” ontwikkeling, en mondiale bestaanszekerheid. Een vraag zal zijn of de Expert Meeting kan convergeren op een agenda die op coherente wijze employment/work, social security, environmental sustainability accentueert en op weliswaar bevlogen wijze maar toch met benen op de grond kijkt naar repercussies in termen van structuren van ‘global (economic) governance’.

 Een ander punt hier is de nieuwe context rond ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Aandacht dient te worden geschonken aan nieuwe actoren/donoren (fondsen, maar ook opkomende landen) met eigen beleidsvisies.

 Ad ii: Diverse van de in voetnoot 1 opgesomde documenten bevatten ook suggesties voor uitbouw van de VN-architectuur in de richting van een meeromvattende “governance”. Ook uit de kring van DSE en aanverwante netwerken wordt uitbreiding van de institutionele structuur (systemische verandering) bepleit. In o. a. de klimaatdiscussie is bijvoorbeeld een groeiende interesse in mondiale belastingen of andere vormen van opwekking van geldstromen ten behoeve van de financiering van klimaatbeleid of andere vormen van ontwikkelingsfinanciering of facilitering van de voorziening met ‘global public goods’. Vergt dat niet een global treasury? Er wordt in VN-kringen gedacht over “global economic governance”. Hoe denken wij daarover? En Hoe verhoudt zich dat tot de de facto machtsstructuren als de G20 en tot de VN.

 Doel en Opzet Expert Meeting

 Doel: Het doel van de bijeenkomst is om, tegen de hierboven geschetste achtergrond, te bezien in welke richting en hoe het PDSE-perspectief op internationale ontwikkeling en governance kan worden aangescherpt. Nadrukkelijk wordt voorop gesteld, dat het uitputtend behandelen van alle drie thema’s op een bijeenkomst van 1 dag onmogelijk is; het gaat dus om verkenningen en om elementen van een perspectief. Een aantal van de genoemde speerpunten/thema’s kunnen nader worden bekeken tijdens de expert-meeting; soms kan worden voortgebouwd op resultaten van eerdere expert meetings.

Opzet: De expert meeting dient een discussiegericht karakter te dragen, op basis van een aantal korte inleidingen langs drie lijnen: (i) perspectieven op mondiale ontwikkeling, (ii) internationaal ontwikkelingsbeleid en -strategie, (iii) naar ‘global economic governance’.

De inleiders zal worden gevraagd om vooraf een relevant artikel en/of stellingen (maximaal 1 A4) van hun hand beschikbaar te stellen, zodat een optimale voorbereiding door de overige participanten mogelijk wordt en de inleidingen zelf inderdaad bondig kunnen blijven. Voor elk van de inleidingen is 30 minuten beschikbaar. Uiteraard is er tijd voor discussie; in een aantal gevallen zal de discussietijd van verschillende opeenvolgende inleidingen bijeen worden gevoegd.

Participatie: uitnodigingen gaan naar (personen uit de instanties op) de onderstaande lijst.

• Platform + aanpalende CSO (MFO, milieu, etc),

• OXFAM/NOVIB, ICCO, HIVOS, CORDAID, Both Ends, FOE/MD, Greenpeace, OIKOS, SOMO; Terra Reversa, ANPED, 11-11-11, Broederlijk Delen.

• Verwante kringen in academia, (RUN, UvT, VU, ISS, UA, UG, etc)
• Verwante kringen in de politiek (met name de Zuid-Noord denkers daarin): GL/PvdA/CU/SP, en in België: Spa, etc.

Dagvoorzitter: Ted van Hees

Organisatie: ondersteunend secretariaat Esther Somers (met Lou Keune en Hans Opschoor)

Verslag: Platform DSE

 Programma

NB: verschillende hieronder genoemde externe personen zijn nog te vragen.

 09:30 – 10:00 Aankomst en koffie

10:00 – 10:15 Lou Keune: welkom, inleiding op EM, introductie dagvoorzitter

 Sessie I Perspectieven op mondiale ontwikkeling

10:15 – 10:45 Francine Mestrum: Alternatieve perspectieven

10:45 – 11:15 Discussie

11:15 – 11:25 Korte pauze (koffie/thee)

Sessie II Beleid: Prioriteiten, Strategieën, Kanalen

11:25 – 11:30 Overgang van Sessie I naar sessie II (voorzitter)

11:30 – 12:00 Rolph van der Hoeven: Werk/Bestaanszekerheid en de Reductie van de Mondiale Inkomensongelijkheid

12:00 -12:30 Discussie

12:30 – 13:15 Pauze (lunch + frisse neus)

13:15 – 13:45 Hans Opschoor: Groene Economie en Internationale Ontwikkeling

13:45 – 14:15 Kees Hudig: Globalisering van Onderop en Internationale Ontwikkeling

14:15 -15:00 Discussie

 15:00 – 15:10 Korte pauze (koffie/thee)

 III Institutionele en Structurele Implicaties voor Global Governance

15:10 – 15:15 Overgang van Sessie II naar sessie III (voorzitter)

15:15 – 15:45 Eric Goeman: Mondiale Fiscaliteit en andere Systemische Veranderingen voor een Solidaire Wereldorde

15:45 – 16.15 Geske Dijkstra: Global Economic Governance” en “the Powers that Be”.

16:15 – 17:00 Discussie

17:00 – 17:15 Samenvatting (implicaties visie PDSE, eventuele volgende stappen) door Hans Opschoor

17:15 Sluiting door dagvoorzitter

17:15 en verder: Borrel

Bijlage: sprekers:

Eric Goeman (Attac-Vlaanderen)

Ted van Hees (PDSE, OXFAM-NOVIB).

Danielle Hirsch (econome, directeur Both Ends)

Rolph van der Hoeven (oud ILO, AIV, ISS)

Kees Hudig (globalifo.nl)

Peter Knorringa (ISS, ex VU).

Francine Mestrum (PDSE, VUB, UGent)

Hans Opschoor (ISS, UN-CDP, ex VU)

Geske Dijkstra (EUR)

Jan Vandemoortele (ex UNDP)

Robert Went (WRR, ex UvA)

EM Internationaal Ontwikkelingsbeleid en Mondiaal Bestuur

 Lijst van documenten

 (Klik op de titels of links om het document te krijgen)

*) Ackerman, Frank: The Shrinking Gains from Trade: A Critical Assessment of Doha Round Projections (2005)

*) Bachelet, Michelle: Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive  Globalization (pdf)

*) Bauwens, Daan: Vooral rijke landen worden beter van ontwikkelingshulp (2011)

*) Biezeveld, Gustaaf: Ecosysteemdiensten in gevaar(2010)

*) Christian Aid: Hungry for justice: Fighting starvation in an age of plenty (2011)

*) Childers, Erskine: The United Nations and global institutions. In Development Dialogue no. 56 (link naar pdf-file) pag. 149-161

*) Childers, Erskine: The United Nations in the ‘New World Order’. In Development Dialogue no. 56 (link naar pdf-file) pag. 201-215

*) Childers, Erskine: The United Nations in a world of conflict – Assuming our responsibilities . In Development Dialogue no. 56 (link naar pdf-file) pag. 261-277 (with a commentary by Jan Pronk)

*) Christian Aid: Hungry for Justice – Fighting Starvation in an Age of Plenty (2011)

*) De Ville, Ferdi De: Herverdeling leidt niet tot minder groei, integendeel (2011)

*) Earth System Governance: Policy Brief on the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (2011)

*) Graaf, Kars de, Hilde Komduur, Lester von Meijenfeldt: Juridische stappen naar een duurzame en solidaire samenleving (verslag EM, 2011)

*) Hees, Ted van, verzameling documenten (pdf)

*) Hudig, Kees: Mondiale Bestaanszekerheid (verslag EM 2009)

*) ILO and WHO: The Social Protection Floor: a joint crisis initiative of the UN Chief Executive Board for Co-ordination on the social protection floor. Geneva, Oct 2009

*) ILO and IMF: The challenges of growth, employment and social cohesion. Joint ILO-IMF conference in cooperation with the office of the prime minister in Norway. Oslo, 13-09-2010 (link naar pdf-file);

 

*) Keune, Lou: Development Cooperation: A Hindrance for Self-Sustainable Development (2005 / 2006) (pdf-versie)

 *) Keune, Lou, en Francine Mestrum: De grote leugen van ontwikkelingssamenwerking (2007)

*) Keune, Lou : Bestaanszekerheid en de vernieuwing van het Mondiaal Economisch Beleid (2006)

 *) Keune, Lou: The Myth of Development Aid (2009)

 *) Koch, Han: Pleidooi voor wereldwijd sociaal vangnet.Trouw 19 9 11

 *) Opschoor, Hans: Mondiale Bestaanszekerheid: een inleidend overzicht (2009)

*) Opschoor, Hans: Sustainable Development and a Dwindling Carbon Space (2010)

*) Rio + 20 Police Brief,  Transforming governance and institutions for a planet under pressure (pdf)

*) Schulmeister, Stephan (Austrian Institute of Economic Research) The European Monetary Fund (pdf)

*) Stiglitz, Joseph, en anderen: The G20 and Recovery and Beyond (e-book als pdf)

*) Stichele, Myriam van der: Internationaal Ontwikkelingsbeleid en Mondiaal Bestuur: naar een nieuw perspectief

*) Terhal, Piet: Enkele internationale dimensies van de transitie (2009)

*) Terhal, Piet: Mondiale Instellingen (2009)

*) UNCTAD 2010. Towards a New International Development Architecture for LDCs. UN New York and Geneva (link naar pdf-file)

*) UNDP: Illicit Financial Flows from the Least Developed Countries: 1990-2008 (Commissioned Report from Global Financial Integrity)

*) UN-DESA’s 2010:  World Economic and Social Survey 2010: Retooling Global Development. UN, NewYork (link naar pdf-file); UNCTAD 2010.

*) Witte Rang, Greetje: Thematisch Verslag van de Expertmeeting Economie & Vrede (2009)

Platform Duurzame en Solidaire Economie (DSE) voert op allerlei niveaus campagnes in Nederland om te bevorderen dat de economie structureel verandert in de richting van ecologische duurzaamheid en sociale rechtvaardigheid. Platform DSE doet dit door kennis daarover te vergaren en te verspreiden, door bijeenkomsten te organiseren, publicaties uit te brengen en netwerken op te bouwen en te ondersteunen die dat doel onderschrijven.

In haar boodschap benadrukt Platform DSE niet alleen de noodzaak en urgentie van een economische transitie, maar ook de kansen die die biedt. Het is nu nog goed mogelijk om een bewuste en gestuurde omslag te maken. Als we die kans niet benutten, zullen we door de grenzen van wat de planeet aankan hardhandig daartoe gedwongen worden.

Platform DSE heeft de laatste jaren de drukbezochte Conferentie van Tilburg georganiseerd, over onder andere de noodzaak van een andere kijk op economische groei. In december 2009 werd het ‘voorstel voor Fair & Green Deal’ uitgebracht, met inbreng en steun van mensen uit vele maatschappelijke organisaties. Rond dat voorstel werd de Alliantie Fair & Green Deal opgericht.

Voor de nabije toekomst heeft Platform DSE nieuwe bijeenkomsten, expertmeetings en publicaties gepland en wil het zijn kennisbasis versterken door economisch onderzoek te doen en internationale netwerken te benutten. Zie voor meer informatie de website www.platformdse.org

Bij alle fraude, wanbeheer en rock and roll-management in grote maatschappelijke instellingen zijn er tot nu toe –naar mijn weten- geen polder- of waterschappen betrokken geweest. Ze zijn het toonbeeld van braafheid. Wat wel eens ontbreekt, is onderhoud aan wat vitale dijken, niet alleen rond 1953, waar ik als Zeeuw direct ervaring mee had. Ook recent nog bleek dat onderhoud soms wel eens wat lang uitgesteld wordt.

 

Dan is het wel anders met anders met de echte financiële wereld. In 1967 maakte ik daar als stagiair op de internationale afdeling van The First National Bank of Chicago (destijds een van de 10 grootste banken in de VS) voor het eerst echt kennis mee. Uit die periode heb ik drie dingen onthouden: politieke druk behoorde tot het normale repertoire. Er werd in die zelfs actief meegewerkt aan het bevorderen van een regeringswissel in een Z. Amerikaans land om een lening terug betaald te krijgen. Tweede voorbeeld, de landelijke maatregelen voor krediet beperking werden omzeild door aan het eind van de maand als de kredietverlening gemeten werd een flink aantal kredieten over te schrijven naar een Londense dochter. Het derde wat ik onthouden heb is Terry, een collega stagiaire. Ze maakte een verwoestende indruk op mij door de combinatie van schoonheid en slimheid én ze was heel leergierig.

 

Met de financiële wereld is het sinds die tijd niet veel beter geworden. Nog steeds worden regeringen met toegelaten en niet toegelaten middelen overgehaald om de zin van de bankiers uit te voeren. Nog steeds worden de grenzen van de wet opgezocht en wordt ook de ruimte daarbuiten verkend om de winstmarges op te krikken.

 

Is dan misschien de Nederlandse poldercultuur een model om een duurzame financiële wereld te organiseren / bereiken?

 

Polderen heeft in de Nederlandse arbeidsverhoudingen veel succes gekend. Het accoord van Wassenaar (in 1982 tussen vakbeweging en werkgevers) is in dit verband een historisch voorbeeld. We kwamen zoals dat destijds heette van de ‘Dutch disease’ (is niet hetzelfde als hollanditis dat ging over kruisrakettenverzet) te veel leven op en van de aardgasbaten én een hoge werkloosheid, terecht in de ‘Dutch miracle’. Jelle Visser en Anton Hemerijck publiceerden hierover een boek onder deze titel. Zij trekken 5 lessen uit de toepassing van het poldermodel:

1. Herziening van de welvaartsstaat kan niet zonder sociale consensus.
2. Herziening van de welvaartsstaat is risicovol, met hoge politieke risico’s. Daarom moet er licht zijn aan het einde van de tunnel, ofwel reëel uitzicht op positieve ontwikkelingen (bij het accoord van Wassenaar dus stijgende werkgelegenheid).
3. De derde les is de les van geduld. Partijen moeten bereid zijn zich voor lange termijn aan afspraken te houden.
4. Een vierde les leert dat tegenkrachten het eenvoudigst zijn te ontmantelen als hervormers kunnen onderhandelen met de belangen van anderen en toekomstige generaties.
5. Corporatisme –ofwel nauw samenwerken tussen werkgevers en werknemers- is geen garantie op succes. Door het streven naar unanimiteit kan het overleg vastlopen en zelfs verworden tot een vechtende meute ‘overleg-actoren’¹.

 

Deze lessen zijn nog steeds actueel en lijken in hoge mate op een aantal belangrijke uitgangspunten die van toepassing zijn bij de in de mode zijnde transitieprocessen.

Maar alvorens nu juichend de polder in te lopen eerst nog wat van de keerzijde van het polderen:

 

• Er is sprake van gesloten circuits ons kent ons; gevestigde belangen zijn bepalend. Nieuwkomers worden geweerd.
• De besluitvorming is van een grote stroperigheid, veel tijd vergende en gevoelige procedures.
• De gesprekken worden uitsluitend gevoerd met veel meel in de mond. Moet je eens proberen en horen wat dat oplevert.
• De transparantie is ver te zoeken.
• Veel tijdelijke oplossingen worden bereikt door ze in commissies deponeren.

Tot slot:

• Polderen leidt niet tot systeemwijzigingen. Het is eerder een bevestiging van het naoorlogse compromis over de welvaartsstaat.

 

Als we nu proberen om ons polderen geactualiseerd en verbeterd in een transitieproces toe te passen op de financiële wereld en de banken in het bijzonder dan vallen meteen een paar zaken op:

• De bankenlobby is buitengewoon sterk en effectief
• De internationalisering is vrijwel 100%.
• Men probeert altijd gaten te vinden in het systeem.
• M.a.w. als een verandering niet in het belang van het financiële systeem is, zal de verandering niet doorgaan of ten principale gefrustreerd worden.

 

Een voorwaarde voor een transitietraject is het ontwikkelen van een gemeenschappelijke visie. Kunt u het zich voorstellen Gerrit Zalm of Jan Hommen op weg naar duurzaamheid? Het transitietraject lijkt hiervoor niet geschikt.

 

Niet minder eenvoudig overigens zit het met de politieke macht die dergelijke veranderingen zou moeten initiëren en handhaven. De politieke macht is de laatste decennia vooral bezig geweest om ruim baan te geven aan de markt. Die ideologie waarin de heilstaat wordt omgebouwd tot heilmarkt wordt nog steeds uitgedragen. De politiek zaagt zijn eigen stoelpoten onder zich weg. Trivialisering van de politiek noemt Paul Kalma² dit proces.

 

Laten we onze inspanningen maar richten op het ontwikkelen van eigen geld- en banksystemen. Munten die van ons zelf zijn en banken waar we iets over te zeggen hebben.

Hebben we trouwens eigenlijk wel iets te zeggen over ASN en Triodos? Zij hebben een goede koers, maar hebben wij er ook iets in te brengen? Dat is een vraag die ik hier tot slot wil deponeren.

 

Hoe het verder gegaan is met Terry? Een beschaafd iemand speculeert niet en publiek over oude liefdes. Een beschaafde cultuur zou alle vormen van speculatie moeten verbieden.

 

Dan u wel.

 

John Huige 060312

Voor eerlijker prijzen is de ontwikkeling van Fair Trade-producten heel belangrijk. Er is al een mooi assortiment op de markt gebracht. Maar natuurlijk moet alle handel Fair worden. Het ILO zou daar een goede rol in kunnen/moeten vervullen.

Voor de correctie naar echte, ook ecologisch betere prijzen is bijvoorbeeld de biologische landbouw belangrijk. De prijzen zijn daar nu hoger, maar als men voor de gangbare producten de milieukosten had moeten betalen, dan waren de biologische producten in verhouding goedkoper dan gangbare producten. Dat berekende het Bureau Berenschot al in een rapport in 1989. Maar in  de landbouw, en bijv. ook de energievoorziening en de vervoersector betalen de vervuilers niet. Vliegen is daarom goedkoper dan reizen per trein.

Om echte prijzen te krijgen voor alle producten zou een footprinttax uitkomst kunnen bieden. Dan betaal je een variabele belasting naar gelang het product een grote of kleine Voetafdruk heeft. Dus dan betaalt de vervuiler naar evenredigheid. Zie het artikel van Mark Huijbregts e.a. over het meten van de Voetafdrukken. Voor met meten van de onttrokken waarde aan de aarde door bedrijven is het COP-model (pdf)  (Cost of Planet) van Roland Menke interessant.

Quotering van schaarse en schadelijke producten en stoffen

Het is eerlijk en effectief om bij groeiende schaarste en schadelijkheid, het gebruik per persoon van producten en stoffen te beperken door een verdelingssysteem. Erg schadelijke producten moeten natuurlijk verboden worden.

Om de uitstoot van CO2 te beperken en eerlijk te verdelen ontwikkelde David Fleming het systeem van Klimaatdukaten, beschreven in zijn boek, dat door uitgeverij Jan van Arkel ook in het Nederlands is uitgegeven.

Een stap verder is het quoteren van het gebruik van grond en fossiele energie via een rechtvaardig verdelingssysteem van onze mondiale voetafdrukken, ontwikkeld door Bert Vink. Hij bedacht de Terra’s als gequoteerd tweede betaalmiddel. Zie de betreffende tekst.

Omdat schaarste tot (grote) conflicten kan leiden, wordt er al meer nagedacht en gewerkt aan vormen van quotering, onder anderen door de jurist Gustaaf Biezeveld, die in 2009 hoogleraar werd in Groningen. De titel van zijn oratie luidt: Onze ecologische voetafdruk – Hoe het milieurecht kan helpen die te verkleinen.

Jan Juffermans, maart 2012.

 

 

HUMANITY IN THE FACE OF A GREAT TRANSITION

 

How to save the people and not the bankers

 

 

 

 

Towards the end of June 2011, the world faced for the first time in recent history, the possibility of a financial collapse that not only threatened the countries of the periphery or in one or two European countries, but also the US. Since then panic has become widespread, the price of gold has sky-rocketed, and we hear more and more about an imminent Great Depression. We truly are not before a new recession or a “double dip” like the mainstream media wants us to believe, but before the Great Depression of the 21^st C. Even the data readjusted for 2011 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) show that the GDP of the US declined in the last quarter of 2008 by 8.9%. According to other data reported by the BEA that usually shows lower numbers after readjustments, 2009 registered a negative growth of 3.5%. Per capita GDP at current prices demonstrate that the US entered a recession already in 2005 (The Economist, August 6, 2011, p. 28). This is why we have to go more back in time to search for the causes of the depression. Let’s summarize.

 

 

Since the end of the seventies of the last century, the rate of profit declined in the productive sphere. In other words, it declined in those sectors where the real wealth is produced: value and surplus value. This is so, because since World War II the average life of fixed capital has gradually declined to the extent that the cost of technological renovation cannot be compensated by a larger reduction of the cost of labour once the technology has been introduced. Driven by the need to be ahead of the competition in the development of cutting edge technology, fixed capital’s average lifespan has been reduced at the expense of its rate of return. Since then Keynesian economics is in crisis and neoliberalism has come to take its place. The time was ripe to look for cheaper labour force outside the metropolis and/or to import cheaper labour force from the periphery. As labour became flexible globally, the reserve army of labour was to be found worldwide and the degree of exploitation in the real economy was intensified.

 

 

In the metropolis, we do not observe a move of capital towards the productive sphere instead we see how capital tries at all costs to abandon the productive sphere. Capital takes refuge more and more in the fantastic world of the self-expansion of money. In other words, capital tries to realize profit and accumulate in the speculative and unproductive spheres of the economy. Profit here tends to be higher, but it does not contribute to increase real wealth. Profits act as a form of entitlements that demand participation in real wealth, without have taken part in its creation. It is fictional capital and fictional profit. They develop as forms of dispossession and concentration of the real wealth that has been produced at the global level. Such profits intensify the competition for the distribution of the mass of surplus valued produced globally without effecting a real increase of it at global level.

 

 

In order to guarantee the good functioning of this economic logic, the deregulation of the financial system became necessary in the decade of the eighties. The measures that were adopted promoted the exponential growth of investment banking and of new financial instruments known as hedge funds and derivatives. Huge financial networks were created that functioned without any type of fiscal or legal control or constraint. In the last decades, financial capital resorted to a significant expansion of credit to finance its commitments to the future. This translated into an increased expansion of titles in financial markets that was sustained by an inverted pyramid of credit that was not backed by a major growth of the real economy. In short, with neoliberalism we enter into a casino type economy that is more and more global in scope. As long as the objective of appropriation and concentration of real wealth is maintained, credit will serve only to finance this speculative movement. This upward spiralling does not only generate (fictitious) profit, it is also a mechanism of appropriating the mass of real wealth produced in the world by a minuscule club of the super rich that have control over this process.

 

 

The actual size of the inverted pyramid of titles that is built on the ever- shrinking base of real wealth makes palpable the magnitude of fictional capital and its fictitious profits. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported in its June 2011 issue of Quarterly Review that it had received information that by December 2010 a total of 601 billion dollars of derivatives had been issued. This sum is ten times more than the net world GDP, however, the real number of derivatives issued is probably an underestimation as there is no obligation to report it. Trace Mayor (“The great credit contraction,” sample 9; Premier Ark Editors, 2009) estimates that the real number of derivatives issued is 30 times the world GDP. In reality it is very hard to measure its real dimension. Sooner or later the fictional capital will disappear in an unprecedented financial collapse. The strategy of those who possess this gigantic inverted pyramid of investments is to incorporate as many mechanisms as possible that allow them to hoard the lion’s share of the productive or real wealth before or when the collapse takes place. This is a politics of subordination to the global financial networks of not only countries of the periphery like Latin America in the past, but also in the final analysis, even superpowers like the European Union and the US.

 

 

The creation of a Euro zone and the European Union was a political attempt of this continent to avoid being absorbed by the tentacles of the two financial octopuses of the City of London and Wall Street. Today we face the threat of the bankruptcy of states in the European Union and even the US. This demonstrates that not even the metropolis can stay safe from the encroachment of the Global Financial Network. We can see their unified efforts through the Financial Funds of Global Investment (FFIG) and the way big banking and corporations are strategically managed. It is a diversified network that operates with a maximum of anonymity and secrecy; it is where the struggle for the control of transnational capital takes place and where they are able to transform themselves into global financial networks. These networks function like “Private States without borders and citizens” that are unaccountable to none and nobody. It is a form of capitalism without citizenship. (See Dierckxsens, Los límites de un capitalismo sin ciudadanía, DEI, 2011; 104-108 y 152-155)

 

 

How is this global financial network structured? The findings of a study conducted by Swiss researchers Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder and Stefano Battison of the ETH in Zurich, Switzerland entitled The Network of Global Corporate Control show that 737 companies control 80% of the transnational network of corporations and that only 147—what the researchers call the “super entity”—control more than 40% of this global network (http://pijamasurf.com’23.09.2011) Half of the 50 largest corporations are US American. Great Britain occupies the second place with eight, followed by Japan and France with four each, Switzerland, Holland, and Germany with two each, China, Canada, and Italy one each. Here we can draw a comparison with the secret Bilderberg Group. We can add also that 12 of the 25 companies with the greatest nodes or connections are well-known financial institutions. They are in order of importance: Barclays PLC from Great Britain, WE Morgan Chase, UBS AG, Merrill Lynch & Co, Deutsche Bank AG, Credit Suisse Group, Bank of New York Mellon, Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; Morgan Stanley; Mitsubishi Financial Group Inc.; Societé Géneralé and Bank of America Corp. The “super entity” is no longer composed mostly of big corporations of the real economy instead increasingly it has been taken over by financial institutions with Wall Street and the City of London at the forefront. (See chart below).

 

 

Chart

 

The Super- Entity of the World Economy

 

 

 

These financial institutions have the capacity to speculate in the market and have privileged access to enormous quantity of information. Thanks to these researchers we are able to understand how the great bubbles and financial crises that we have witnessed in the last years originate, and how these great corporations in contrast to the majority of the population can report great earnings in the context of the global economic meltdown. We can understand the phrase: they are too big (powerful) to fail. The major stockholders can exert massive influence through their connections with other transnational corporations, concentrating so much power in their hands that they are able to destabilize entire countries and even the US. It is clear that the fictitious capital is concentrated in Wall Street and the City of London. The forces that subordinate productive capital at a large scale operate from these places and are in the position to control the metropolis.

 

 

The Struggle to Restructure the World Order in the Current Crisis

 

 

The current crisis is not only an economic chaos or panic that overwhelms us, but it is also the stage where different interests struggle to manage the economic and political processes at a global scale. The current crisis is the expression of the struggle to re-redistribute the global mass of real wealth. This redistribution no longer confronts countries of the metropolis against each other like in the past world wars. This time financial capital engages in a warlike strategy to enlarge its areas of influence and establish a global order under its hegemony through the creation of a global state without borders and citizens. This newly created “social territoriality” requires a new state form: a state-global financial network that has sovereignty over a social territory. This war will have winners and losers inside and among the great economic powers themselves that are based on territoriality. Formento and Merino, two Argentinean authors that wrote the excellent book The Struggle for the Reconfiguration of the World Order (Peña Lillo/Ediciones Continente, Buenos Aires, 2011) emphasize that the imposition of global financial power responds to a logic that transcends the subordination of some countries to other countries or an imperial country. In the new world order they say, “the global networks need to supersede the US as the only world superpower and advance to a new form of imperialism that has no central country as hegemonic and exclusionary power.”

 

 

In the US, we observe how the conflict of economic interests uses the global financial crisis as a strategic political struggle that resembles a financial-political-media war. The conflict of interests inside the divided Anglo-American financial power bloc is deepening and globalizing. Formento and Merino (p.9) talk about a conservative US American financial fraction led by JP Morgan and the Bank of America now steeped in crisis and the globalist financial power fraction led by Barclays, Citi Group, Lloyd’s Bank. Clearly, the global financial network is not monolithic. The latter group wants to create a state form that is global, without geographic borders and citizens and is not anchored in any territory, not even the US territory. Its territory is social. According to the global networks, Formento and Merico tell us, “there should be only colonies, no colonizing countries; colonizing countries themselves must be colonized territories”. Global financial networks have been already successful incorporating many Latin American countries, and now they are targeting the European Union and the US itself. It is through the pyramidal multiplication of fictitious capital as entitlements or rights over the ever- larger portion of the world’s real wealth produced each year that they are able to control effectively the productive assets in the world and thus, its process of reproduction. This internationalized power in the form of a global state seeks to impose its own global currency and to accomplish this it is ready to destroy the area of influence of the Euro and even the hegemony of the dollar. (Formento y Merino, p. 21)

 

 

How can we envision the new imperial modality? It is a form of imperialism that is deployed as a hierarchical network of global financial cities with cities like New York and the City of London as its centre and other local nodes in cities like Paris, Tokyo, Shanghai, Frankfurt, Moscow, Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bombay, Sydney, Johannesburg, Sao Paolo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City and others. The principal nodes would give the global state its shape and there would be a global division of labour that assigns each region a specific role. In this context, the hegemonic power of the US as a unipolar, unilateral or even trilateral force in the world now becomes an obstacle to the realization of the Anglo-American globalist economic interests. The Anglo-American power bloc controls the largest portions of transnational financial capital and the largest financial network in the world under the leadership of Citi Group, Lloyd’s Bank, HSBC, Rothschild, Shell, Barclays and others. The Democratic Party best represents the political interests of this group since the Clinton administration, and today with the Obama – Hillary Clinton administration.

 

 

The main characteristics of the global-state-network can be summarized as follows: a) Constitution of a Global Government articulated within the G-20 as a unipolar multilateral sphere. Opposing this trend is the multi-polar multilateralism of other power fractions of the European Union that struggle not to be absorbed in this sphere. We can also mention the BRICS and China that presents a degree of autonomy and even UNASUR. It is not surprising then to watch how these groups support the Euro to prevent the European Union from falling under the aegis of dominant global financial capital b) the development of an imperialist global network consisting of a network of financial cities as a mean of social territoriality; the state modalities are constituted by the structures of strategic management of the cities. The central command are the global financial networks that make up the Financial Funds of Global Investment (FFIG). The aforementioned regional power fractions oppose this trend; c) the emission of global electronic money through the granting of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the IMF or other ways of keeping the global financial networks always at the centre. This form of politics implies the elimination of the dollar as the leading currency and the dismantling of the Federal Reserve Bank as a global bank. This is opposed by the US financial bloc that seeks to maintain the hegemony of its country; ch) optimum liberalization of global commerce through the WTO; d) the development of the Global Armed Forces through NATO and UN Peacekeeping forces; e) a fictional, virtual democracy composed of demobilized and disorganized majorities, in other words, a global citizenship under the sovereignty of financial media power (See Formento and Merino, p. 57 & 58)

 

 

There is a fraction inside the US power bloc that opposes this political project. These are conservative forces that try at all costs to preserve the hegemonic power of the US. Thus, it is important to them to keep the dollar as the leading global currency in order to fund their military might. It also needs to strengthen its position vis-à-vis other groups. Their politics still rests on the control of geographic areas. According to their logic, Latin America must be annexed through free-trade agreements and the consolidation of a continental defence strategy. Latin American projects like the ALBA, UNASUR, and the South American Defence Council go against these political projects of the North. The deployment of the US Fourth Fleet ran parallel to the installation of the South American Defence Council. At the very moment that the coup in Honduras was taking place to prevent the consolidation of an autonomous South American power bloc, the Pentagon was allowed to install in Colombia seven military bases.

 

 

This US American power bloc appears as a unipolar, unilateral strategy of the Pentagon and prefers building regional blocs that are kept under the leadership of the US (Brzezinski), but this project is more and more difficult to sustain. The Pentagon and the financial fraction of JP Morgan, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Big Pharma, Exxon Mobil of Rockefeller and others support this political strategy. The Republican Party under the George W. Bush administration best represented this group politically. The economic weakness and backwardness of this US American power bloc was compensated by its military strategy. After loosing the midterm elections in 2010, the globalist Anglo-American fraction is having serious difficulty in imposing their program. (Formento & Merino, pp. 63-79). As the globalist and nationalist forces appear to struggle with each other, a third force arises with the mass movement ‘Occupy Wall Street’ that now advances an alternative project. The more both former parties struggle the more the alternative forces may arise.

 

 

The current wave of speculative attacks targets the public debt that has been accumulated by the governments of the metropolis. In the context of a debt crisis, the creditor banks seek to exchange the most difficult debt titles to collect against productive assets, in other words, in the real economy of the debtor countries. This type of regime was applied to Latin American towards the end of the 20^th C., and the turn has come now to the countries of the metropolis. The importance of the ratings agencies in this speculative wave is significant. Many entities like the pension funds that carry billions in investments, are tied to these rating agencies of credit and are forced to submit themselves to their ratings. When the credit rating of a country is lowered (intentionally), the sale of bonds is massive and consequently they loose their price value, simultaneously raising the interest rates for new credit. The new credit can only be obtained under severe conditions of structural adjustment policies that were very well known in Latin America during the decade of the 80s of the last century. To ensure the installation of the global state without borders it is necessary to first subordinate the European Union and its Euro zone as well as the US and its dollar. The threat of bankruptcy is the weapon par excellence.

 

 

Through the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) one can engineer a financial coup against a particular country or several countries at once like the so-called PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain). The CDS are derivatives of credits that act as if they were insurance policies to protect themselves from debts (public debt in this case) that have become UN-payable due to the lowering of their ranking by rating agencies or by the increase of interest rates that the their low credit rating produces. The Credit Default Swaps and the interest rate swaps are the markets of Wall Street and the City of London par excellence. The real objective of the Anglo-American globalists is not necessarily to bankrupt the countries of the periphery of Europe or that they abandon the Euro zone, but to steal their assets that were produced in the real economy. Bankruptcy is a mean to do so but not the very objective.

 

 

The Globalist Anglo-American Forces and the Euro

 

 

There are several credit rating agencies in the world, but among the most important are the Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. During the international economic crisis, rating agencies play an important role in the daily fluctuation of financial markets. Any raising or lowering of the credit score (or any other similar indicator) of a particular nation will immediately have an impact in the markets and the economy. Just as banks rank their clients using credit scores before granting a loan, international financial organizations have their own methods and objectives to rank countries in order to grant or deny them financial support.

 

 

Fitch Ratings is associated with the Bank of France and Renault and responds to the politics in Brussels. The purpose of cutting Greece’s credit rating to junk status was a step towards a greater centralization of the European government, and it appears to be working as it survived the speculative attacks at the end of the summer and the fall of 2011. S & P has its headquarters at the City of London and is part of the most global financial network that works with Barclay and others. It was the first one to lower the credit rating of Spain causing a contagion effect over all the European periphery reaching even Italy. This gave way to the speculative attacks centred on insurance contracts (securities) or Credit Default Swaps (CDS) fearing the eventual bankruptcy of these countries.

 

 

Global financial capital was able to put the European economy back on track after the experience with the Greek crisis. Through the rescue plan of the PIIGS, it was possible to transfer the risk of the peripheral countries to the central countries of the Euro zone. The Germans, Finnish, Dutch, Austrians and the French must now pay tribute to stabilize the peripheral countries of Europe. In actuality, it was all about rescuing German and French banks. It is in this context that a German-French project emerged to create the fiscal integration of Europe. This would imply the transfer of taxes from the North to the South. This transference, which began taking place in the present crisis, has provoked an ultra conservative backlash in the North. Popular sectors demanded to leave the Euro zone. Global rating agencies were of the opinion that if the crisis did not break out in the South, it should break out in the North. The risk of having northern European countries leave the Euro zone was not great. Were they to abandon the Euro zone, their exports to the South of Europe would be seriously in danger.

 

 

The ultimate goal of the German-French project is to avoid falling under the aegis of Anglo-American financial capital. The German-France axis continues to consolidate as a power bloc with a hard currency and a fiscal integration to prevent its subordination to Anglo-American global financial forces. The politics is to: a) deepen the gap between countries with trade and fiscal surplus like Germany and China and countries with a trade and fiscal deficit like the US and Great Britain. b) to increase protectionist measures and economic warfare among blocs. To preserve their domain over the real economy the German-French project is to confront Anglo-American global capital with a politics of adjustment-savings-investment-production-export-superavit. (See Formento & Merino, Op. Cit. 120-127).

 

 

To prevent subordination to Anglo-American global financial forces European financial capital finds tactical allies with other big banks in the US, like Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs is one of the bigger banks in New York which is not allied with mentioned Anglo-American forces. Since the Euro-crisis Goldman Sachs became a central economical and political player in Europe. Mario Draghi, the present president of Europe’s Central Bank, Mario Monti who succeeded Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Lucas Papademos the new prime minister of Greece they all are or were part of Goldman Sachs. In this context it becomes clear that the real battle in the Euro crisis is one between the big bankers at a global scale. Will survive this alliance or will triumph the Anglo-American global financial forces, or will emerge a more radical social movement at a global scale against the bankers in general (See, Emilio Marín, ‘Goldman Sachs, dueño de parte de Europa, EE UU y algo más’, in www.rebelion.org, 11.12.2011).

 

 

Europeans find in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) tactical allies for their project. In the meeting of the G-20 October 20 it became already clear that Russia and China would support the Euro. Anglo-American forces meanwhile tried to snatch the real assets of Europe through the business of speculating with the public debt and looking for bankruptcy of ever bigger countries. If they do not win this bet the burden of the collapse of fictitious capital would fall over Wall Street and the City of London. Towards the end of November 2011 it looked like if the global Anglo-American financial capital had lost an important battle: The creation of the European Fund for Financial Stability with external support represented a great loss for them. They have lost another battle, but the war continues. Amidst this confrontation of the forces of capital, a space is opened for radicalized progressive forces that fight for de-globalization and a decoupling from neoliberal globalization. As the Great Depression of 21^st C looks to be a reality these forces may become more radical and internationalized. If 2011 represented springtime, harvest time might become quiet close in 2012.

 

 

The greatest fear of the Anglo-American is that the Euro zone not only transforms itself into Great Germany but it may do so, even worse, in alliance with China and Russia as part of the Euro-Asian Continental Bloc. The constitution of the Euro-Asian Continental Bloc would implicate the definitive defeat of global Anglo-American capital. The Euro-Asian Continental Bloc clashes not only against global Anglo-American capital, but also with unilateral and imperialist conservative forces of the US. In this context we observe that actually the geopolitics of Anglo-American global capital promotes the transfer of the scenarios of war in oil producing countries in Iraq and the Middle East (a major interest of US conservatives) towards countries that can break the integration of China and Russia. In the context of this encirclement of the Euro-Asian Continental Bloc we can expect an all out war against Iran. This means a possible direct confrontation with China and Russia. We can hear the drums of war again of a direct confrontation among superpowers.

 

 

The Anglo-American Forces and the Dollar

 

 

The strategic objective of the Anglo-American project is not only to destabilize the Euro, but also the dollar. At the end of June 2011 the S&P lowered the credit rating of the US for the first time in history. This was a warning that the sole superpower of the world ran the risk of not being able to pay its debt. This caused immediate panic around the world. Global bankers seem to deliberately want to destroy the dollar and the current financial system. The purpose is to produce a shock effect in order to establish a new system. Global bankers want to take advantage of the panic to replace the dollar and the Federal Reserve Bank with a global monetary authority controlled by the global bankers themselves free of any state control, even of the US government. (See John Truman Wolfe, “A Greek Tragedy, Part III www.johntrumanwolfe.com April 4, 2011).

 

 

Moody’s, the third credit rating agency, is associated with Goldman Sachs and the US conservative power bloc. It has threatened recently to lower the credit ratings of both the US and Great Britain and even find a way to integrate both countries into the formula of PIGS. (See Formento & Merino, pp. 106-11) In a scenario where Anglo-American forces advance, the opposing poles that feel threatened must find a way to protect their interests as a bloc. Conservative US anti-globalist forces need to maintain the dollar as the leading international reserve currency, guarantee their domination through the military industrial complex and the Pentagon, control the Middle East and tap into their oil reserves and deepen their intervention in Latin America. This backward fraction of Anglo-American financial power bloc is anchored in neo-conservatism and is the fraction that mostly takes the conflict to the terrain of politics and military intervention. It needs to perpetuate traditional US power and deploy a neo-conservative strategy that is both fundamentalist and militarist, and even neo-fascist.

 

 

As the conflict deepens, the division of the power bloc becomes more visible making possible the development of nationalistic social movements like the Tea Party. The internal struggles in the US reached new highs on November 2010. The midterm elections were won by the Tea Party. Bush’s nationalistic and even neo-fascist tendencies were strengthened in the process. In the event of a tie of hegemonic forces, the Tea Party begins to mobilize against who they consider the enemy of the country: Obama and the global financial oligarchy embedded in Wall Street, New York and the City of London. According to conservative groups, these centres of power want to destroy the ‘American Dream.’ The neo-conservative fraction imposes its agenda of reducing public investment (except military expenditures), putting a stop to raising taxes, defending unilateralism and militarism in foreign policy and putting forward its cultural and ideological obscurantism. The current tie between the two conflicting hegemonic forces has left the field open to new and alternative forces as Occupy Wall Street. As the Great Depression of 21^st C will be a fact in 2012 social and political movements will grow to new highs in the midst of the election race.

 

 

How to Save the People or the Struggle for a New Civilization

 

 

As we could observe in 2011, the globalization project that is torn by class warfare from above and showing no boundaries has reached a climax. It has generated class warfare from below and made possible the emergence of a popular subject beyond its borders. The popular sectors that have been historically subordinated in the US and Europe take advantage of the conflict of interests inside the global financial bloc. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ best symbolizes this new space. The Great Depression of the 21^st C. involves the collapse of neoliberal globalization and opens new venues for alternatives. The Great Depression of the 21^st C. is not only a threat; it also constitutes a message of hope. A global rebellion is making its way in the world creating a new collective subject that has the potential of achieving a civilizatory change. The rejection of the bankers is becoming international with the movement of the ‘indignados’ or the outraged. On October 17^th, there were demonstrations against the bankers in one thousand cities in over one hundred countries. Only in Spain there were one million demonstrators. Hungry has formally accused the bankers of being responsible for the financial crisis of the country. Other countries will follow. (See Geab 58 October 17^th 2011)

 

 

The Great Depression of the 21^st C. has provoked a crisis of legitimation of global proportions. It appears as if we would enter a new era of rebellions and revolutions that reminds us of those that took place in Europe in 1848. We can speak of a global political awakening and awareness. Although this new awakening manifests itself different in every country and region, it is global in nature. This is no longer an isolated rebellion in one country or region like North Africa or Southern Europe, it can explode in every corner of the world, even at the heart of the financial centres of New York and the City of London as we could see in the events of 2011. Western civilization itself could be put to question.

 

 

Over the last decade, we have observed in Latin America a deep questioning and decoupling away from neoliberalism. In 2008-2008 we witnessed popular uprisings in Sub-Saharan Africa due to famines. 2011 has seen famines in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya, and now the FAO warns us of a new generalized famine in Africa and other continents. This is due mainly to the increase in prices of staple grains and speculation. We have been watching in North Africa, with the exception of Algeria, rebellions against labour instability and social insecurity for decades now. For several decades, political stability was only achieved by installing dictatorships. As the opportunities for international migration diminished, the possibilities of realizing the individual or familial projects outside of the home country were shattered. The ‘American Dream’ or the ‘European Dream’ doesn’t lead to a greater politicization in the country of origin.

 

 

The crisis and unemployment in the metropolis posed serious obstacles to migration. The solution to the problems of millions and millions of migrants of the periphery since then only could be found in their own countries. This demands collective action. It has the effect of politicizing the population, in particular, the young who were the ones that migrated in droves. Rebellions surged in Northern Africa and became widespread. Economic depression and massive unemployment in Europe and the US have also provoked their own popular uprisings that we had not seen for many decades. We can no longer say that it cannot happen in core countries. Today rebellions can surge anywhere and at any moment. We are living an era of rebellion and so an era of hope and opportunities to change the world.

 

 

The economic rationality of today tends to deny life to an increasing portion of the world’s population both in the centre and the periphery; it tends to shorten the service life of workers causing great economic and social insecurity. The same logic destroys the shelf life of products as they become disposable, and even the lifespan of the machinery and business equipment is reduced in the search for having the cutting edge technology in the competition of markets. It destroys the natural world to the extent that it destroys non-renewable resources. Capital negates life in all realms as its own logic of reproduction. It promotes the death of all that is incorporated in its logic. It therefore runs the risk of succumbing to its own rationality. It is my contention that as capital negates life and sows death in so many fields, capital ends, in ultimate analysis, negating life in the reproduction of itself. In other words, it is a system that is programmed to self-destruct.

 

 

We believe that human beings are the product of history as well as the producers of history, and not the least through labour. The possibility of building a political project that can change the economic rationality does not depend exclusively on the will of the people nor is it predetermined by so-called objective conditions. Liberal democracy is not nearly the exclusive historical project of a social class. The same can be said of alternative projects, be it socialism, civilizatory change or simply another phase of global capitalism under the hegemony of a global state. The key is provided in the intersection between the political will and the historical moments that allow a change in the economic rationality. We think that the Great Depression of the 21^st C. is characterized by a crisis of civilization of a specific historical moment that offers the opportunity to transcend borders based on a political project destined to change the current economic rationality.

 

 

The global crisis will promote and amplify the decoupling from neoliberalism. In the last decade, Latin America has tended to free itself from the politics of annexation of the most conservative wing of US politics. The non-approval of the ALCA as a politics of annexation was a deep disappointment for US politics. The politics of decoupling continued in Latin America with the ALBA and Petrocaribe. Ecuador and Bolivia joined the politics of decoupling and other countries followed suit. The Union of South American Countries UNASUR that was constituted in 2008 signified the emergence of a new regional power bloc and new beacon of liberty. Today we are witnessing decoupling attempts from neoliberalism even in Europe and the US.

 

 

How to Confront Bankers

 

 

Global bankers were able to subdue entire countries by using the burden of debt, something that could only be achieved in the past through war. The imposition of a debt can be understood as a financial war and therefore as odious debt. National economies have the right to defend themselves before such aggressions the way Iceland did through two referendums. Iceland did not rescue the bank (Icesave); it rescued its people. Mainstream media tries by all means possible to hide from public view the historical lesson that Iceland has taught us. Greece preferred to save foreign banks rather than its people. The Greek people had to rescue the banks by enduring a severe austerity program and a deep recession. The usual credit rating agencies committed fraud by classifying the Greek debt to junk status. Debts that have been acquired through fraudulent acts or corruption are illegitimate, and even illegal. This odious debt can and must be cancelled. The odious character of the debt can be demonstrated through an audit of the people, an audit that we support. (See Eric Toussaint: Es necesario anular las deudas ilegitimas, interviewed by Sebastian Bruklez)

 

 

The more countries and regional blocs get involved in the fight against global corporate greed and the banks, the more is it possible to conform an international mass movement that can rescue the people, and not the bankers. The Great Depression of the 21^st C. creates the climate for the nationalization of the banks to make them work for the common good. The recent nationalization of the Dexia Bank is a case in point. It is necessary to regulate the banks just as it was done after the Great Depression in the 20^th C. It is imperative to impose on banks where people deposit their money and savings, a financial discipline that does not join investment and commercial banking together. It is important to exclude securities from banking. It is also necessary to control and put limits on the flows and outflows of capital to a country, as it is now done timidly in Europe with the Credit Default Swaps. Obviously, to accomplish this it will be necessary that governments be forced to change their economic politics radically by decoupling from neoliberalism. (See Paul Armstrong et al. Germany riskier than the UK for the first time since January 2008, in www.bloomberg.com August 9, 2011)

 

 

How to engineer the change of history

 

 

The project of globalist bankers is to subordinate the countries of the metropolis, including the US and the European Union by stealing their productive assets. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was the first attempt to destroy the self-determination of the world’s nation-states in economic strategic matters. The attempt failed in 1998/1999 within the OECD. The present battle against the dollar and the Euro has the same objective. We do not believe, different from Formento & Merino, that the project of the globalist bankers will succeed. The autarchy of these so-called Private States without Borders and Citizens is very dependent on the unsustainable investments in the unproductive sphere of the economy. The lack of commitment of these Private States to its citizens and their borders is precisely their weakness in a geopolitical conflict between them and to confront the interests of economic blocs with citizens and borders that are oriented much more to the productive sphere. To envision the forthcoming collapse of western banks it is necessary to look at what is happening in the City of London and Wall Street. It has become clear that Greece and the Euro were two fingers pointing at the problem, but they were not the problem themselves. The Greek debt reveals the infamy of the banks of yesteryear and can explode any moment. The Euro is the needle that will explode the balloon in the future that is the financial system of today.

 

 

The City of London, Wall Street and the mainstream media blamed in 2011 the fiscal debt crisis on Greece and Euro throwing up in that way a smokescreen that concealed the impending débâcle of Wall Street and the City of London. One can assess the state of the western banking system by measuring the evolution of bank personnel, its performance, and stockholders. Both Wall Street and the City of London have announced since mid 2011 incessantly the lay-off of hundreds of thousands of its employees. A ‘perfect political-financial storm’ has been predicted for the end of 2011 and the first trimester of 2012. Western banks will become decimated of its personnel, benefits, and finally a large quantity of banks will go bankrupt. In 2012 we may expect the collapse of the global banking system of the City of London and wall Street. As this succeeds, the time has arrived to demand the nationalization of banks with audits of the citizens. (See geab 58, October 17 2011)

 

 

In the meantime, the real economy has moved to the emergent countries. According to The Economist, (August 6, 2011, p.66), in terms of the purchasing power these emergent countries (defined here as those countries that are not part of the OECD), encompassed in 2011 already 54% of the world’s GDP. It is really surprising to find out how 52% of car sales and 82% of cell phones are sold in these countries. The export sales of all these countries together surpassed in 2010 more than 50% of the world’s exports against 27% in 1990; together they held 81% of international reserves and only 17% the world’s public debt. These countries consumed 60% of the world’s energy, 65% of copper, 75% steel, and 55% of the oil. China is the strongest of the emergent countries with more than 49% of their GDP in investments compared to 16% of the US. As Chinese exports lowered and will lower even more during the Great Depression of 21^st C, investment in China are made in huge housing- and infrastructure projects that sooner or later will lead to a new exploding bubble.

 

 

During 2009, spurred on by the government, China’s banks increased their lending by almost 1.5 trillion dollar. This is roughly twice the size of the Indian banking system. Much of this lending flowed to some 10,000 investment companies sponsored by local governments, which cannot borrow directly in their own name. These companies set about buildings roads, bridges,irrigation works and housing schemes of dubious merit. In 2010 the loans of local governments totalled about 35% of GDP (Simon Cox, ‘Keynes v Hayek in China, in The Economist, “The world in 2012” page 71). A copy of Manhattan is under construction an hour’s train ride from Beijing. Debt accumulated by companies financing local governments such as Tianjin, home to the New York lookalike project, is rising the debt disclosed by all 231 local government financing companies that sold bonds, notes or commercial paper through Dec. 10 this year. The total amounted to $622 billion, mostly in bank loans, more than the current size of the European bailout fund (Bloomberg News, ‘China Debts Dwarf Official Data With Too-Big-to-Finish Alarm’, Dec 18, 2011) . Many of these projects will fail to raise enough revenue to repay their creditors. Defaults have already surfaced in Yunnan province and elsewhere. A not determined amount of these projects will be abandoned halfway. The expected exploding bubble will impact the economies of Africa and Latin America particularly and so deepen the Great Depression of 21^st C..

 

 

Latin America has a potential even in crisis time as it will be forced to a more endogenous economy. The continent geographically is bigger than Russia. Latin America is the largest producer of food in the world, and it possesses the most important biodiversity reserves and water resources of the world. The South American territories have the largest reserves not only of fossil fuels and agro-fuels, but also of minerals in the world. As these resources become more scarce and strategic to its own economies, a unified continent can channel these resources to a more endogenous use, and even preserve them for future generations. In the context of the Great Depression a politics of self-reliance or relative autarchy, becomes not only a possibility it will be from then on a necessity. All these elements build a solid base for a proper real economy in emergent countries in the context of the crisis.

 

 

Capitalism cannot survive without economic growth, independently if this occurs in the metropolis or the emergent countries. The increasing relative or even absolute scarcity of natural resources compromises the economic rationality of capitalism. A politics of preservation or of the reduction of the exploitation of natural resources as espoused by the indigenous communities and peasants organized, as “Los Sin Tierra” in Brazil will only increase the scarcity. The demand of a political project that is more endogenous in the periphery during the Great Depression of 21^st C. means that fewer natural resources will be available in the world market. Sooner or later the rationality of capitalism fails against this extra-economic factor when this recession looks to be one of decades. There will be an excellent opportunity and even no other way out than expanding the shelf life of products.

 

 

The use value starts winning over the exchange value. The expansion of the life span of the use values will decrease the effective demand in terms of its value. The era of a negative growth at the world scale seems to be a fact, and it announces a new civilization. To satisfy the same need would demand less time as the average shelf life of products would expand. According to the social accountability of the content, the productivity of labour would increase. From the perspective of the form, we see the contrary, as we experience a negative growth. To be able to manage more your own natural resources in the periphery is becoming a social subject that can change the global rationality of capitalism in a more profound way than the classic seizing of power in the last centuries. Here is where we envision the beginning of a new civilization.